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ADVERSE INTERESTS AND ARTICLE III: A REPLY 
James E. Pfander & Daniel Birk 
ABSTRACT—Scholars and jurists have long sought an explanation for why 
the Framers of Article III distinguished “Cases” from “Controversies.” In a 
previous article that cataloged the exercise of federal jurisdiction over 
uncontested matters, such as pension claims, warrant applications, and 
naturalization proceedings, we tried to provide an answer to this question. 
We suggested that, at least as to “cases” arising under federal law, the 
federal courts could exercise what Roman and civil lawyers called non-
contentious jurisdiction or, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, could 
hear uncontested claims of right in the form prescribed by law. As for 
“controversies,” by contrast, the federal courts were limited to the 
adjudication of disputes between parties aligned as Article III specifies. 
Much that seems strange about the practice of federal jurisdiction becomes 
clear when viewed in light of our proposed interpretation. Thus, our article 
accounts not only for the difference in Article III’s text, but also for the 
refusal of the federal courts to hear uncontested matters of state law, such 
as some probate and domestic relations proceedings.   
Our account also calls into question the claim that Article III embeds 
inflexible “injury” and “adverse-party” requirements in the definition of 
judicial power. It was those claims that triggered the response from 
Professor Ann Woolhandler, to which this Article briefly replies. 
Woolhandler argues that Article III requires not adverse parties, so much, 
as adverse interests. In the course of doing so, she embraces a late 
nineteenth-century revisionism that twisted the meaning of Article III. In 
the end, however, she fails to offer a coherent theory of the text of Article 
III or to explain why her newfangled adverse-interest construct better 
explains the history of judicial practice than the eighteenth-century 
construct of non-contentious jurisdiction with which the Framers were 
familiar. 
AUTHORS—James E. Pfander, Owen L. Coon Professor of Law, 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Thanks to Ann Woolhandler for 
disputing our ideas with rigor and grace, and to Bob Pushaw and George 
Rutherglen for comments on a draft of this reply. Daniel Birk, Partner, 
Eimer Stahl LLP; Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, J.D. 2010. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Article III extends “the judicial Power of the United States” to “all 
Cases” arising under federal law, and to “Controversies” between specified 
parties (for example, states against other states or their citizens).1 Over the 
past century, the Supreme Court has asserted that Article III requires a 
dispute between adverse parties before a federal court can assert 
jurisdiction, and scholars have generally accepted that assertion. In a 
lengthy article, we challenged the conventional wisdom on textual and 
historical grounds.2 We acknowledged that Article III “Controversies” have 
been thought to require a dispute between adverse parties, but that several 
categories of federal law “Cases” require no such dispute. Instead, 
continuing a practice derived from Roman law, federal courts frequently 
exercise “non-contentious jurisdiction” over the registration or recognition 
of ex parte claims of right based on federal law. 
Responding to our article on non-contentious jurisdiction, Professor 
Ann Woolhandler has offered a qualified defense of the conventional 
wisdom.3 In arguing that Article III may incorporate an adverse-interest 
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. 
2 James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, 
and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346 (2015). 
3 Ann Woolhandler, Adverse Interests and Article III, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1025 (2017). 
111:1067 (2017) Adverse Interests Reply 
1069 
requirement, even if it does not strictly mandate adverse parties,4 
Woolhandler refines some of our claims and contests others on a qualified 
basis. Woolhandler, however, does not directly address many key elements 
of our article, notably the textual and historical case we made for arguing 
that the “judicial power of the United States” includes both contentious and 
non-contentious forms of jurisdiction and for distinguishing between 
“Cases” and “Controversies” in Article III.5 Nor does she set out to refute 
the historical argument that non-contentious jurisdiction was an important 
category of judicial business in the Roman and civil law traditions and a 
likely feature of the conception of judicial power in the early Republic.6 
She agrees that the exercise of federal judicial power in non-contentious 
applications for naturalized citizenship offers strong support for our claim.7 
In the end, she concludes not that the evidence affirmatively supports an 
adverseness requirement, but that the evidence we presented does not quite 
carry the burden of proof (which she seems to have assigned to us).8 
Professor Woolhandler has presented her case with customary skill, 
using the familiar tools of lawyerly discourse. When lawyers dispute, we 
frame the problem to our own advantage, draw lines, create categories, 
reason analogically, and assign burdens of proof.9 Woolhandler highlights 
not the practice of the courts of the early Republic, which included a cluster 
of non-contentious proceedings, but what people said about the work of the 
federal courts one hundred years later, at a time when certain jurists were 
developing revisionist accounts of the Article III reference to “Cases” and 
“Controversies.”10 She thus emphasizes judicial statements from the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century (and an earlier statement that 
Representative John Marshall made on the House floor in a political 
4 See id. at 1108–09. 
5 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1417–23. 
6 See id. at 1403–16. 
7 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1065. 
8 See, e.g., id. at 1107 (arguing that we “have not made the case for reconsidering adversity 
requirements for Article III cases”). One might argue that the burden of proof rests with those who 
would seek to refute the understanding of cases and controversies put forward by the leading jurists of 
the Founding Era and consistent with early federal court practice, rather than with the revisionist work 
of the last few decades. See discussion infra Part II. 
9 Cf. DOUGLAS WALTON, LEGAL ARGUMENTATION AND EVIDENCE 1–33 (2002). 
10 Thus, Professor Woolhandler emphasizes the early twentieth-century decision in Muskrat v. 
United States, see Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1027 n.4, 1053–54, which itself drew on the revisionist 
late nineteenth-century efforts of Justice Stephen Field to redefine the case-and-controversy 
requirement to include an across-the-board requirement of party adverseness applicable to all 
proceedings brought before Article III courts. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1421–22 (tracing the 
genealogy of Justice Field’s conflation of “cases” and “controversies”). 
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speech).11 Such an approach to history enables Woolhandler to privilege 
statements that appeared long after Article III was implemented and long 
after such leading figures as Chief Justice John Marshall (speaking as a 
judge rather than as a politician) and Justice Joseph Story (speaking as a 
judge and as a law professor) defined cases in Article III broadly enough to 
encompass both adverse-party claims and claims to register an interest 
through an original invocation of non-contentious jurisdiction (as in the 
naturalization cases over which they both presided).12 Woolhandler does 
not explain why we should prefer the revisions of the Gilded Age to the 
choices of the Framers. 
In Part I of this reply, we express appreciation for Professor 
Woolhandler’s work and identify points of unstated agreement that emerge 
from a careful review of her Article. Part II identifies the areas on which 
we join issue. In our view, the civil law concept of non-contentious 
jurisdiction—a feature of Roman law, the legal systems of continental 
Europe and Scotland, and the civilian courts of England—provides a more 
coherent and workable explanation for the willingness of early federal 
courts to entertain proceedings lacking adverse parties than Woolhandler’s 
explanation that some of these proceedings included or could have included 
11 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1026 (quoting Marshall’s speech on the House floor in 
connection with the Jonathan Robbins extradition debate). Woolhandler does quote Blackstone’s 
Commentaries for the proposition that every court must contain a plaintiff, a defendant, and the judicial 
power, see id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25), but Blackstone himself later 
acknowledges that his discussions of courts and court proceedings in England deliberately omit 
unopposed voluntary jurisdiction proceedings in ecclesiastical courts: 
I pass by such ecclesiastical courts, as have only what is called a voluntary and not a contentious 
jurisdiction; which are merely concerned in doing or selling what no one opposes, and which 
keep an open office for that purpose, (as granting dispensations, licences [sic], faculties, and 
other remnants of the papal extortions) but do not concern themselves with administering 
redress to any injury . . . . 
BLACKSTONE, supra, at *66. We conjecture in our Article that an excessive focus by American scholars 
on the modes of proceeding in common law English courts has obscured the broader experience of the 
lawyers of the founding generation with civil and continental law proceedings, such as the voluntary 
jurisdiction exercised by ecclesiastical and local colonial courts. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 
1350–53, 1410–16. 
12 In their judicial and academic writings, Marshall and Story agreed that a case arises when a party 
“asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.” Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 
819 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1646, at 424 (photo. reprint 2005) (2d ed. 1851). We think for obvious reasons that the 
comments of Chief Justice Marshall, delivered after years of experience in the federal judiciary, have 
greater probative value than those he made before he joined the bench in the political context of the 
Robbins debate. In the course of a lengthy judicial career, Chief Justice Marshall had concrete 
experience with naturalization petitions and would confirm the legality and finality of such decrees 
against challenges that they were improperly ex parte. See Spratt v. Spratt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 393, 408 
(1830). 
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parties with adverse legal interests. Part III focuses on what we see as 
Woolhandler’s failure to offer a workable alternative to the model we set 
forth for evaluating the legitimacy of congressional decisions to assign 
non-contentious jurisdiction to the federal courts. 
I. POINTS OF AGREEMENT
A. Adverse Parties
In our earlier work, we set out to criticize a particular construct that 
had emerged in decisions over the last few decades: the notion that Article 
III incorporates an “adverse-party” requirement.13 That was the claim 
Justice Antonin Scalia put forward in his dissenting opinion in United 
States v. Windsor; in arguing that the basis for federal court jurisdiction 
over that case disappeared once the United States announced that it agreed 
with the legal position of its party opponent, Justice Scalia repeatedly 
spoke of “the requirement of party-adverseness,” the idea that an Article III 
case or controversy requires “disagreement between the parties.”14 Many 
others, both scholars and jurists, have similarly challenged the capacity of 
the federal courts to perform various kinds of non-contentious work on the 
view that the work fails to comply with a party-adverseness requirement. 
For instance, criticisms of practices such as federal judicial engagement 
with warrants,15 with bankruptcy administration,16 and with the oversight of 
13 See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974) (“While the Supreme Court of 
California may choose to adjudicate a controversy simply because of its public importance, and the 
desirability of a statewide decision, we are limited by the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. III to 
adjudication of actual disputes between adverse parties.”); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“In 
part [the] words [‘cases’ and ‘controversies’] limit the business of federal courts to questions presented 
in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial 
process.”); Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1039 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“The mootness doctrine is a beneficial one, expressive of the need for adverse parties who 
will vigorously argue the conflicting contentions to the Court and a necessary one in light of the 
requirements of Article III.”); Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 
2016) (“An Article III case or controversy requires at least two adverse parties.”), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 494 (2016); Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Article III sensibly 
requires the federal courts to refrain from determining the validity of . . . legislation until the issue 
reaches us as part of a genuine case or controversy between adverse parties—i.e., in a case presenting a 
claim of concrete and actual or imminent injury traceable to the named defendants which is redressable 
by the authority of a judgment against those defendants.”). 
14 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2701 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
15 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1379 (discussing testimony in which Lawrence Silberman 
argued that federal courts could not constitutionally oversee ex parte applications for foreign 
surveillance warrants because of the nonadversarial character of such proceedings).  
16 See Ralph E. Avery, Article III and Title 11: A Constitutional Collision, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 397 
(1996) (arguing that certain non-contentious features of bankruptcy administration may violate Article 
III). 
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settlements17 and consent decrees18 have all been predicated on a claim that 
these practices fail the requirement of party adverseness. 
We demonstrated that the text and history of Article III, as confirmed 
by longstanding practice, do not incorporate a thoroughgoing requirement 
of adverse parties.19 We showed, for example, that federal courts have long 
been permitted to entertain naturalization and voluntary bankruptcy 
petitions, to award title to property in admiralty proceedings, and to preside 
over the entry of default judgments—all situations in which no adverse 
party necessarily appears before the court.20 We also showed that such 
proceedings were part of a well-established tradition of using courts to 
ratify or authorize an adjustment or declaration of legal rights or status: a 
concept called voluntary, or non-contentious, jurisdiction in the Roman and 
civil law. We accordingly rejected the familiar claim that non-contentious 
matters necessarily lie beyond the power of the federal judiciary, urging 
instead that insistence on adverseness has a more limited, prudential role to 
play. 
Happily, although Professor Woolhandler defends a place for an 
adverseness requirement of sorts, she agrees with us that many of these 
proceedings pose no Article III difficulty.21 She does so by reformulating 
the requirement as one of “adverse interests.”22 As Woolhandler notes, 
echoing what we said in our initial piece,23 the parties may not always 
advocate adverse positions before the court. In that sense, the parties do not 
appear as formal adversaries, or may not take actually adverse positions. 
But so long as the invocation of judicial power takes place in the context of 
opposing or adverse interests, she agrees that the court can proceed to enter 
a binding judgment.24 
In one sense, Professor Woolhandler’s account shares something in 
common with that of scholars who have tried to explain instances of non-
contentious jurisdiction by invoking the “potential adversary,” an idea that 
17 See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-
Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2006) 
(arguing that the adverse-party rule, a constitutional entailment of Article III, forecloses federal judicial 
oversight of so-called settlement class actions). 
18 See Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Government? The Problems 
with Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637 (2014) (contending 
that consent decrees lack the adverseness necessary to warrant judicial involvement). 
19 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1355–58. 
20 See id. at 1361–63, 1365–67, 1371–74, 1384–85. 
21 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1032–40. 
22 Id. at 1032–33. 
23 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1384–87 (discussing default judgments and consent decrees). 
24 Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1033–35. 
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Justice Stephen Field seems to have invented in the Gilded Age.25 But the 
potential adversary theory cannot supply a concrete adverse party in the 
here and now, as we observed in our prior work.26 If Article III inflexibly 
demands adverse parties, as some have suggested,27 then the potential 
adversary hardly fills the bill.28 Woolhandler deals with that problem by 
recharacterizing the Article III requirement as one of adverse interests.29 
That allows her to explain how individuals who completely agree as to the 
resolution of a particular legal problem can nonetheless secure a judicial 
decree confirming their conception of the problem’s resolution. What 
matters, for Woolhandler, is not whether the parties contest claims in court 
but whether they have possibly adverse interests that can be adjusted either 
through litigation or through settlement. Adverse interests, then, allow 
Woolhandler to bring practices that we treated as non-contentious within 
the framework of adverseness that she seeks to defend. She thus accounts 
for some non-contentious work by suggesting that adverse interests lurk 
beneath. For example, and as we observed in explaining the power of a 
federal court to enter a default judgment, it would make no sense to allow a 
debtor to disable a court from entering a judgment by agreeing that the 
obligation was due and owing.30 
Professor Woolhander’s adverse-interest construct, we think, 
represents substantial movement towards our position that the adverse-
party requirement is not a constitutional limit on federal court jurisdiction. 
For one thing, Woolhandler agrees with our position (in contrast to the 
many scholars who have defended more demanding adverse-party 
requirements) that federal courts can proceed to decree in the absence of 
active party contestation.31 For another, use of the construct of adverse 
interests usefully explains why some matters can be regarded as proper 
grist for an Article III judiciary accustomed to overseeing adversary 
disputes. Finally, the adverse-interest construct helps to confirm, as we 
showed,32 that Justice Scalia began from an incorrect premise in United 
25 See In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).  
26 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1395–96. 
27 See, e.g., Redish & Kastanek, supra note 17, at 567 & n.80, 570. 
28 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1396. 
29 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1032–35. 
30 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1441.  
31 Thus, Professor Woolhandler would apparently agree with us in rejecting Morley’s challenge to 
the exercise of federal judicial power over consent decrees and Redish and Kastanek’s argument against 
the entry of judgment in settlement class actions. In both instances, adverse interests would be at stake. 
32 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1350–51. 
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States v. Windsor.33 Windsor and the United States did have adverse 
interests, as signified by the government’s refusal to grant Windsor a tax 
credit.34 Although Woolhandler does not address the question in specific 
terms, we take her position to be that the adverseness on display was 
sufficient to ground the jurisdiction of the Article III judiciary. By 
defending a less categorical version of adverseness, rooted in an ability to 
identify adverse interests among actual or potential parties, Woolhandler 
abandons as indefensible much of the lore that has grown up around the 
view that there must be actual (and actively) adverse parties to every 
federal court action. 
B. Admiralty Practice
We also applaud the careful work Professor Woolhandler has done to 
better understand some in rem features of admiralty practice.35 She shows 
that potential adverse interests doubtless underlay much in rem litigation, 
even though the suit proceeded against the property before the court and 
did not require the identification of and notice to particular adversaries as a 
condition of adjudication.36 Woolhandler shows that, in many instances, 
adverse parties learned of the pendency of suit and could come forward or 
not as they saw fit to dispute the claims being made.37 We agree with all of 
that (and did not argue to the contrary in our earlier work). We would add 
that, in a good many cases, as Justice Story recognized, the prize claim 
went forward without the slightest contestation whatsoever.38 In such cases, 
the federal admiralty courts proceeded on an inquisitorial basis, collected 
evidence through depositions, and registered claims of right against 
property.39 Therefore, party contestation was not essential to ground 
jurisdiction. Moreover, in the many cases where no adverse party appeared 
33 See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2701–02 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia previewed his 
Windsor dissent in Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 256–57 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting), urging 
that petitions for a certificate of appealability did not assert a claim against any adverse party and thus 
fell beyond the judicial power.  
34 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682 (majority opinion). 
35 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1036–40. 
36 See id. Indeed, the eventual demise of in rem jurisdiction reflects the Supreme Court’s 
acceptance of the idea that a suit against property effectively operates as “a proceeding against the 
owners of that property.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 205 (1977). 
37 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1037–40. 
38 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1420 n.349; Kevin Arlyck, Forged by War: The Federal 
Courts and Foreign Affairs in the Age of Revolution 264–65 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, New York University) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).  
39 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1420 n.349 (quoting Justice Story’s recognition that adverse 
parties need not appear to ground Article III jurisdiction because the court acts as the “general 
guardian” of all interests brought to its attention); Arlyck, supra note 38, at 264–65. 
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or mounted a contest, the existence of adverse interests did nothing to 
change the fact that the actual adjudication was non-contentious. Such suits 
might mimic the form of an adversary proceeding through the fiction of the 
ship as defendant, but they lacked the “concrete adversity” and the 
vigorous opposing submissions that provide the rationale for an 
adverseness requirement.40 
The same was still more true in a category of litigation which 
Professor Woolhandler does not address: the admiralty claim to establish 
title to seagoing property.41 In claims to driftwood or other valuable items 
afloat on the briny sea, there might not have been any adverse interest at 
all, much less a concrete one that could be identified for even potential 
appearance.42 
C. Feigned Cases
Professor Woolhandler agrees with much of what we said about 
feigned cases. We argued that they were not, contrary to widespread 
assumptions, invariably problematic from an Article III perspective.43 
Indeed, when the parties genuinely differed on a legal point, the feigned 
case could provide them with a mechanism for securing what we would 
today characterize as a declaratory judgment.44 As we acknowledged, 
feigned cases do present potential problems, particularly when the parties 
contrive a dispute in order to injure a third party or to procure a 
constitutional declamation on the basis of an incomplete record.45 
Woolhandler usefully extends our critique of the conventional feigned-case 
wisdom and offers a new set of categories—merits collusion and 
40 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 12, at 60 (8th 
ed. 2017) (noting the “risk that comes from passing on abstract questions rather than limiting decisions 
to concrete cases in which a question is precisely framed by a clash of genuine adversary argument 
exploring every aspect of the issue” (first citing United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961); and 
then citing Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969))). 
41 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1368–70. 
42 According to ancient maritime law, “[p]roperty found in the sea, ‘in floods or in rivers, if it be 
precious stones, fishes or any treasure of the sea, which never belonged to any man in point of 
property,’ was adjudged to the first finder.” Lawrence J. Lipka, Note, Abandoned Property at Sea: Who 
Owns the Salvage “Finds”?, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 97, 98 (1970) (quoting The Laws of Oleron, Art. 
XXXIV (Eng.), reprinted in 30 F. Cas. 1171, 1184 (1897)). Admiralty courts might decree a good find 
without contestation, and indeed, without any adverse interest. 
43 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1433–40. 
44 Id. at 1434–35. 
45 Id. at 1435–38. 
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jurisdictional collusion—to help readers keep separate the various forms of 
collusive litigation.46 
We have no quarrel with Professor Woolhandler’s new, more refined 
categories, and we view her work as an extension of our own. Our ultimate 
conclusion was that the eventual rejection of feigned cases by federal 
courts should be read as hostility to what Woolhandler calls collusion on 
the merits by parties who agree as to the result and simply want to use a 
feigned action to obtain some external advantage, rather than as support for 
an adverse-party requirement rooted in the Constitution. Woolhandler’s 
careful parsing of Gilded Age precedent for genuine adverse legal interests 
is not inconsistent with this conclusion. Indeed, by showing the Court’s 
gradual evolution on feigned cases, her discussion might be read to support 
our view that the adverse-party requirement was a later innovation 
designed to regulate collusion more actively rather than an inherent feature 
of Article III. 
II. CONTESTED MATTERS
As it turns out, then, we agree with Professor Woolhandler about 
many things and we have reason to hope that she will acknowledge her 
agreement with us. And yet we remain divided on some points of emphasis 
and perhaps on issues of ultimate judicial power. 
A. Naturalization
Consider, for example, the history of non-contentious adjudication of 
petitions for naturalized citizenship. To us, the naturalization example 
offers strong support for the claim that federal courts can adjudicate 
without contestation or adverse interests.47 Professor Woolhandler agrees 
that the petitions themselves do not appear to present adverse interests, and 
she admits that they count as our “best example.”48 
But she then works to downplay the significance of naturalization 
petitions by contending that they had never been formally upheld in the 
face of an explicit jurisdictional challenge until 1926, at which time the 
United States had been installed as a potential adverse contestant.49 While 
this might work as a lawyer’s argument, it does not make good sense as 
history. The historical fact is that the First Congress assigned this 
uncontested work to the federal courts and that such federal judges as John 
46 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1047–54 (distinguishing jurisdictional collusion aimed at 
procuring the resolution of a genuine dispute from the more problematic form of merits collusion). 
47 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1361–63, 1393–1402. 
48 Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1056. 
49 Id. at 1061–65. 
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Marshall and Joseph Story (and everyone else, of course) performed it 
without raising a doubt as to its legitimacy for over one hundred years.50 
They treated their decisions, moreover, as binding adjudications of a claim 
of right and adjusted their definitions of the construct of an Article III 
“Case” to take account of their docket of uncontested work.51 Only after 
Justice Field introduced the idea of required contestation in the Gilded Age 
(abandoning the Marshall–Story definition of a case to propose an 
alternative) did it suddenly occur to parties and jurists that Article III might 
disable the federal courts from hearing naturalization petitions in the 
absence of an adverse party.52 It was this latter-day revisionism—
revisionism that Professor Woolhandler continues to press—that led to the 
Supreme Court’s 1926 decision in Tutun v. United States.53 There, an 
opinion by Justice Louis Brandeis offered a resounding reaffirmation of 
non-contentious judicial power over naturalization and explicitly validated 
the exercise of such power in its purest form as practiced since the 1790s.54 
What, then, should one make of the naturalization example? Much 
depends on how one frames the question. If one frames the question as how 
the naturalization example might fit into a system committed to and based 
on adversary proceedings, then one might, as Professor Woolhandler does, 
conjecture that Justice Brandeis was merely attempting to avoid disturbing 
a longstanding, but mostly harmless, anomaly of district court practice by 
gesturing towards the presence of the United States as a possible adversary. 
It was only in the Gilded Age, however, that Justice Field reframed the 
requirement of a “case” to include real or possible adversaries, and it was 
not until the early twentieth century that Congress even made provision for 
the United States to appear as a party to oppose petitions for 
naturalization.55 
To us, by contrast, the congressional assignment and judicial 
acceptance of naturalization work refute any claim that uncontested 
proceedings to register a claim of right lie beyond the judicial power as it 
was practiced and understood during the early Republic. We couple that 
argument from historical practice with an extensive catalog of uncontested 
proceedings that, we contend, reveal the practice to be alive and well in the 
federal courts.56 We use past and continuing practice to explain and defend 
50 See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. 
51 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1414–21. 
52 Id. at 1421–24. 
53 270 U.S. 568 (1926). 
54 See id. at 576–78. 
55 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1401, 1421–24. 
56 Id. at 1359–91. 
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a textual and historical argument about the important distinction between 
“Cases” and “Controversies” in Article III.57 While parties seeking to 
invoke federal jurisdiction over controversies must join an adverse party 
aligned in the way Article III demands, parties invoking jurisdiction over 
cases need not invariably align an adversary. They need only assert their 
rights “in the form prescribed by law,” as Chief Justice Marshall explained 
using language tailored to accommodate the brute fact that Congress 
sometimes called upon the federal courts to administer the law in the 
absence of party contestation.58 
Professor Woolhandler disagrees. Having distinguished away cousins 
such as pension applications, petitions for remission or mitigation of 
forfeitures, and prize proceedings, she frames naturalization as an 
“outlier,”59 an aberration that does not, alone, suffice to carry the burden of 
disproving her refashioned adverse-interest requirement. Woolhandler, in 
short, accepts the early twentieth century as her baseline and treats the 
judicial rhetoric of that period as the key to understanding the nature of 
party adverseness. But she does not grapple with our textual and historical 
counterarguments or with the history of non-contentious jurisdiction as a 
familiar element of the learned eighteenth-century lawyer’s lived 
experience. Nor does she set out to defend the adverse-interest requirement 
on policy grounds as a useful adaptation that focuses the energies of the 
federal judiciary on its important work as a forum for the resolution of 
disputes and explication of law. (This omission strikes us as odd in part 
because we expressed agreement with some policy-based arguments 
against too broad a modern-day reliance on forms of non-contentious 
jurisdiction.) Her account thus offers a form of living constitutionalism, 
drawn not from text or history but from the doctrinal changes that emerged 
in the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries.60 
These changes also underlie her related argument in prior scholarship that 
57 See id. at 1417–24. 
58 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824); see also Pfander & Birk, supra 
note 2, at 1419 & n.345 (discussing and providing additional examples of Marshall’s use of similar 
language). Professor Woolhandler contends that the formulations provided by Marshall and Story are 
“not inconsistent” with an adverseness requirement. Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1029 n.10. If, by 
this, Woolhandler means that the statements do not definitively state that no such requirement exists, 
then she is correct, though the statements certainly suggest that there was no need for an adverse party 
to controvert the submission of the party appearing to assert his rights. As noted previously, 
Woolhandler does not address the abundant evidence, discussed in our original article, that the courts of 
England, Europe, and the American colonies, as well as legal scholars such as Blackstone and Thomas 
Wood, recognized cases brought under the starkly nonadverse form of voluntary jurisdiction.  
59 Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1065. 
60 Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) 
(advocating a common law understanding of the development of constitutional doctrine). 
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historical evidence and practice support (or at least do not disprove) the 
standing requirement of Article III.61 
B. Pensions
One can see the difference in approach most sharply revealed in our 
competing discussions of Hayburn’s Case.62 We acknowledged that the 
conventional wisdom treats the refusal of some circuit justices and district 
judges to hear uncontested applications for veterans’ pension benefits as a 
reflection of dual concerns with the absence of finality (executive revision) 
and, based entirely on speculation, with the absence of properly aligned 
parties.63 Some of the letters judges wrote in explaining their refusal to do 
the work described the task at hand as work not of a “judicial nature.”64 
Evaluating that language from a latter-day perspective informed by 
conventional statements of the adverse-party requirement, many modern 
scholars have assumed (without careful analysis) that the circuit judges 
were articulating a requirement of party adverseness.65 We showed that 
there was a competing, and superior, explanation of the language. We think 
the judges were expressing concern that it was improper (and perhaps 
undignified) to view the wounds of a veteran in the course of adjudicating 
benefit claims.66 We also showed that at oral argument Attorney General 
Edmund Randolph met the judges’ complaint with a seemingly persuasive 
argument that judges at common law were called upon to view wounds in 
the course of adjudicating mayhem claims.67 Randolph’s apparent 
invocation of the precedent of mayhem claims, as recorded in Justice James 
Iredell’s notes, particularly when coupled with a notable lack of argument 
about the absence of an adverse party, strongly implies that the “not of a 
judicial nature” objection was rooted in concerns about an offense to 
judicial dignity rather than an unarticulated concern about adverseness. 
Moreover, one supposes that, if circuit court judges and justices 
considered uncontested applications for government pensions as work of a 
nonjudicial nature, they would have considered uncontested naturalization 
61 See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 689 (2004) (contending that historical evidence is not inconsistent with standing doctrine as 
currently described). 
62 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); see Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1425–32; Woolhandler, supra 
note 3, at 1056–58. 
63 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1426–27, 1427 n.377. 
64 Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.†; see Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1426. 
65 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1057 & n.154 (citing the work of Russell Wheeler and Susan 
Low Bloch in support). 
66 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1428–29. 
67 Id. at 1431. 
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petitions equally problematic. We therefore questioned the coherence of the 
party adverseness interpretation given the absence of any clear reference to 
concerns about adverseness and the willingness of the same judges and 
justices to hear entirely nonadverse naturalization petitions.68 Finally, we 
argued that the litigation in the Court itself entailed an ex parte submission 
on behalf of Hayburn that did not feature the joinder of any opposing party. 
(Edmund Randolph’s appearance for Hayburn in a proceeding to compel 
the lower court to proceed to judgment on his pension application has been 
shown to have addressed earlier doubts not as to the presence of party 
adversaries but as to Randolph’s authority to proceed without a client and 
without specific presidential authority in his capacity as the Attorney 
General.)69 No Justice was recorded as having questioned this configuration 
of litigants. 
Instead of coming to grips with the evidence that underlies our 
proposed reading of the events surrounding Hayburn’s Case, Professor 
Woolhandler restates the standard assumption that the Supreme Court was 
concerned with the lack of party adverseness in pension proceedings.70 But 
as we have shown, the fact that the Supreme Court later invalidated the 
work of judges as “commissioners” does not, as Woolhandler contends, 
help to establish an adverse-party reading of this series of events.71 The 
Court’s refusal to validate the decisions of circuit judges serving as self-
styled judicial commissioners could have reflected a variety of 
considerations: the fact that the statute assigned the task of reviewing 
pension claims to the “courts” rather than to the judges themselves; the fact 
that the decisions of the judges were still subject to improper executive 
revision; the fact that Congress lacks power to appoint commissioners by 
legislative act (an interpretation that gains support from Congress’s later 
adoption of curative legislation that empowered district judges either to do 
the work themselves or to appoint commissioners).72 While modern 
scholars have instinctively embraced the interpretation, one cannot treat an 
unelaborated concern about the “judicial nature” of pension work as driven 
68 Id. at 1427–28, 1449. 
69 See Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS.
L. REV. 527. 
70 Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1058–59.
71 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1432.
72 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1059–60 (quoting terms of curative legislation). In a portion of
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 45 (1852), the Court 
identified problems with the legislative appointment of federal judges to serve as commissioners as a 
potential argument against the viability of the assignment by statute of nonjudicial work to the federal 
judiciary. 
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by the absence of adverse parties unless one weighs competing evidence in 
the record. 
Professor Woolhandler treats Chief Justice Roger Taney’s decision in 
United States v. Ferreira as rejecting non-contentious proceedings and as 
confirming her interpretation of the events reported in Hayburn’s Case.73 
Both assertions are hard to square with the Ferreira decision itself, which, 
like the circuit court opinions collected in Hayburn’s Case, viewed the 
absence of finality as the master objection to the exercise of federal judicial 
power.74 Indeed, in a most revealing aside, Ferreira appears to have subtly 
acknowledged the propriety of judicial power to “administ[er] the law” in 
uncontested ex parte benefit applications.75 
Ferriera grew out of a claims-processing treaty, in which the United 
States agreed to establish a tribunal to hear claims by civilians seeking 
compensation for U.S. military operations in what was then Spanish 
Florida.76 (After statehood, the claims were handled by the federal judge in 
Florida.) Questions arose as to the nature of the tribunal and as to whether 
the United States could appeal as a party from a decision awarding money 
to a claimant. According to the Court, the statute implementing the treaty 
called for initial review of the claimant’s submission, the issuance of an 
award, and the transmittal of the evidence and the award to the Secretary of 
the Treasury, who was to pay the amount specified if satisfied that the 
award was “just and equitable.”77  
The Court was certainly aware that the typical claim would arrive at 
the district court’s chambers as an ex parte submission, rather than an inter 
partes dispute. Counsel for one of the parties highlighted the point, 
contending that whether or not the United States appeared as a formal party 
on the record, these claims were “‘cases,’ within the legal meaning of the 
term.”78 What blocked the right of appeal, according to counsel, was the 
provision for review by the Secretary of the Treasury.79 The Court took 
precisely that position, acknowledging the ex parte character of the 
proceedings in the language Professor Woolhandler quotes, but focusing on 
the absence of judicial finality in refusing to entertain the appeal. Thus, the 
73 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1027 n.4, 1058 (asserting that their ex parte character was a 
factor in the Court’s conclusion that treaty claims were not Article III cases). 
74 See Ferreira, 54 U.S. at 51–52. 
75 See id. at 51. 
76 Id. at 45. 
77 See id. at 47. 
78 Id. at 44. Counsel made the point in an effort to show that ex parte proceedings were proper 
subjects of the judicial power. On counsel’s view, appeals would lie from decisions adverse to 
claimants, but not from those adverse to the government. 
79 Id. 
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Court explained that the evidence and award were not filed or “recorded” 
in the district court, but were to be transmitted to the Executive to take 
effect only upon decision of the Secretary.80 The claims process thus 
differed from naturalization proceedings, in which decisions of the federal 
court were final and binding, were entered into the record of the federal 
court, and were to control future judicial proceedings.81 
The Court’s acknowledgement that ex parte proceedings lay well 
within federal judicial power came after a lengthy discussion of the 
similarities between the Florida procedure and the problematic procedure in 
Hayburn’s Case.82 For the Court, the problem with both proceedings was 
clear: their nonfinal character made them “entirely alien to the legitimate 
functions of a judge or court of justice.”83 The proceedings thus had “no 
analogy to the general or special powers ordinarily and legally conferred on 
judges or courts to secure the due administration of the law.”84 In this 
revealing passage, the Court acknowledged counsel’s suggestion that ex 
parte claims were proper “cases” for judicial determination; the Court was 
saying that federal courts can administer the law in ex parte proceedings, 
but only when the proceeding yields a final judgment. In the end, then, the 
Court said nothing to support Professor Woolhandler’s interpretation, and 
much to confirm our view that ex parte proceedings (like naturalization 
petitions) can appear as cases proper for adjudication in Article III courts.85 
80 Id. at 46–47. 
81 For this account of the naturalization process, see Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1361–63. 
82 See Ferreira, 54 U.S. at 49–51. 
83 Id. at 51. 
84 Id. 
85 Professor Woolhandler treats the Ferreira Court’s appendix, containing information on the 
unpublished decision in United States v. Todd, as support for interpreting Hayburn’s Case to express 
concern with the absence of adverse parties. See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1059. To be sure, the 
Todd decision invalidated a pension award under the 1792 legislation, holding that the decisions of 
judges as self-styled commissioners were not lawful adjudications. See Ferreira, 54 U.S. at 53. There 
were, as we have noted elsewhere, at least two reasons for that conclusion: that the Act assigned the 
power to the “court” rather than to the judges as such (and thus ruled out action by the judges out of 
court) and that the appointment of commissioners requires action by the President, rather than 
legislation by Congress. Chief Justice Taney invoked Todd to highlight his concern with legislative 
appointment of judges as commissioners. Nothing in his opinion, or in his account of Todd, expresses 
doubts about the power of federal courts to enter judgments in ex parte proceedings, so long as the 
proceedings comply with the requirement of judicial finality. Woolhandler has much to say about 
commissioners and judicial power, but fails to adduce a single case in which the Court has condemned 
as improperly ex parte a procedure in which the lower courts were empowered to enter a final 
judgment. 
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C. Additional Instances of Non-Contentious Jurisdiction
Other aspects of Professor Woolhandler’s article strike us as similarly 
selective. We of course acknowledge that a paper as long and dense as ours 
(a consistent failing it seems)86 contains too much detail to address 
comprehensively in Woolhandler’s compressed and eminently readable 
account. But, without addressing our argument that the sheer number of 
non-contentious practices itself offers systemic support for our thesis, she 
picks out a small slice of our catalog of non-contentious jurisdiction, 
disagrees with some matters of degree on varying but not consistent 
grounds, and leaves aside many of the other exemplars. That leaves a 
whole range of practices that pass without discussion. Among those, we 
would highlight the practices of certifying decisions by the government to 
immunize testimony and ordering the seizure of trademark-infringing 
goods upon ex parte application of the trademark holder.87 
Even the practices Professor Woolhandler discusses emerge relatively 
unscathed as illustrations of non-contentious jurisdiction. 
1. Warrants.—Consider, for example, our treatment of warrant
applications as an instance of the exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction.88 
Our claim was that the federal courts issued legally meaningful decrees on 
the basis of ex parte submissions that did not involve any party 
contestation.89 Professor Woolhandler admits the truth of the assertion, but 
argues that warrants were not dispositive of all issues and did not 
necessarily foreclose subsequent contestation.90 True enough. For example, 
as Woolhandler notes, if execution of the warrant failed to turn up 
evidence, the target might contest some of the warrant’s features in a 
subsequent proceeding or might bring suit against the complainant (or 
informant) for having provided false evidence in support of the warrant’s 
issuance. While certainly conceivable, these possible spin-off claims do not 
alter the fact that the constable could claim legal protection from a trespass 
action when acting pursuant to lawful warrant. Moreover, the possibility 
that the target might later institute an adverse proceeding does nothing to 
imbue the warrant application proceeding with the benefits of adversarial 
litigation, or even to mimic the form of an adversary proceeding. Any 
86 See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1613 (2011) (75 pages).  
87 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1370–71, 1380–81. 
88 See id. at 1375–78. 
89 See id. 
90 Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1043–46. 
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lurking interests would not find expression in submissions to the court or 
magistrate. 
2. Proceedings in State Courts.—Nor does Professor Woolhandler
grapple with the implications of our evidence regarding the wide variety of 
non-contentious proceedings in American state courts, whose general 
jurisdiction embraces a wider variety of subject matters than those 
encompassed by the federal courts. In the eighteenth century, state courts 
regularly entertained non-contentious petitions for adjustment of status and 
judicial certification of transactions such as probate proceedings in the 
common, or uncontested, form.91 Today, state courts continue to preside 
over such matters, as well as over petitions for name changes, adoptions, 
and other uncontested matters of family law.92 To be sure, the Court-created 
justiciability doctrines have come to be viewed as more demanding in 
certain respects than the judicial limits that may apply to some state courts, 
and state precedents have no binding force in federal court.93 Nonetheless, 
state practice illuminates the way lawyers in the early Republic understood 
the nature of judicial power generally and helps to explain why 
assignments of non-contentious work to the federal judiciary did not raise 
any eyebrows in antebellum America. Given the limited nature of federal 
power, occasions for federal courts to adjudicate a change of status or the 
certification of transactions were not as widespread as they were for state 
courts, which heard—and still hear—such matters regularly in probate and 
adoption proceedings. But where such occasions did arise, as in the 
naturalization context, the early federal courts seemed quite willing to 
exercise a non-contentious function. 
91 So-called common form probate applications by the administrator of the probate estate were 
legally effective in clothing the administrator with the power to act and did not require party 
contestation to take effect. In separate work, one of us has proposed that the roots of the Article III 
probate exception lie in the inability of the federal courts to hear uncontested applications to register 
interests based on state law. See James E. Pfander & Michael J.T. Downey, In Search of the Probate 
Exception, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1533 (2014). Matters of state law have a place on Article III dockets only 
if they satisfy the controversy requirement (or qualify for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction), 
something uncontested probate applications fail to do. 
92 On the exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction in family law matters and the origins of the so-
called domestic relations exception to Article III, see James E. Pfander & Emily K. Damrau, A Non-
Contentious Account of Article III’s Domestic Relations Exception, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117 
(2017). 
93 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667–68 (2013). 
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III. THE THEORY OF ADVERSE INTERESTS
A. The Need for a Theory
As much as we applaud Professor Woolhandler for undertaking the 
proposed recharacterization of the adverse-party requirement (and as much 
as we value some aspects of her discussion), she fails to supply the kind of 
detailed framework that would enable us to evaluate her proposed 
recharacterization. Here we borrow Professor Akhil Amar’s idea that it 
takes a theory to beat a theory.94 To be plausible and fairly comparable to 
its competitors, a theory should offer an account of the text and history of 
Article III, an account of judicial and legislative practice under that Article, 
and perhaps a normative justification for the lines drawn. Woolhandler 
does none of these things, aside from offering a rich and very useful 
discussion of federal judicial practice. We cannot say with confidence, after 
reading her paper, what limits her theory would impose, where they come 
from, or what sorts of practices would succeed and fail under her 
assessment. As a consequence, we cannot conduct a comparative 
evaluation of how well our two competing theories “fit” with surrounding 
judicial practices and longstanding institutional commitments. 
One possible vision of adverse interests would essentially read the 
requirement out of Article III altogether. Thus, one could reinterpret the 
naturalization (and veterans’ pension) proceedings of the early Republic as 
cases in which the United States government (as the possible adversary) 
has consented in advance to the entry of a default judgment as to any 
finding of citizenship (or award of pension benefits) that the judge agrees 
to enter upon an ex parte application. Though not a formal party, the 
government, on this view, might be seen as revoking its consent in the 
small set of cases in which it learns of an award that was entered in error. 
Such revocation could then set the stage for an action to recover the 
pension or a proceeding to vacate the naturalization decree. The 
government has a potential interest adverse to all claimants on its largesse 
and poses a threat to institute adverse litigation. Professor Caleb Nelson (a 
generous commentator on a version of our thesis, an inspiration behind the 
adverse-interests theory, and a close student of judicial power) reportedly 
supports such a theory of possible adverseness.95 Professor Woolhandler, 
for her part, indicates that she would not embrace so far-reaching a view, 
apparently due to concerns with the lack of formal notice to the adversary. 
94 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1499, 1566 (1990) (suggesting that one should conduct a comparison of competing Article III 
theories under a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine which theory is more plausible). 
95 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1055 & n.145. 
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But Professor Woolhandler would not apparently require formal 
notice to the possible adversary party in every instance. For example, she 
rationalizes the practice of issuing warrants on ex parte application by 
observing that the targets of such warrants frequently learn of them upon 
execution and can contest their entry at that later stage.96 Where no such 
notice through execution occurs (as with the issuance of FISA warrants),97 
Woolhandler refrains from endorsing the practice as permissible.98 Hence, 
post hoc notice and the prospect of contestation can save a proceeding that 
might otherwise be problematic. What then does she make of prize and 
capture proceedings in admiralty, which made no pretense of specifically 
notifying the possibly adverse claimants in advance and offered no 
mechanism by which an unlucky former owner could contest an erroneous 
declaration of good prize upon later learning of the seizure? Woolhandler 
tells us that potentially interested parties were theoretically notified by 
seizure of the vessel in keeping with the (in rem) procedural due process 
rules of the day, even if many potentially interested parties did not receive 
notice as a practical matter.99 But she does not explain how the un-notified 
potential adversary in a prize proceeding can represent an adverse interest 
more effectively than the unnotified potential adversaries who have been 
targeted for foreign intelligence surveillance. 
By the same token, Professor Woolhandler does not consider whether 
the type of forum in which the potential contest might unfold should be 
weighed as a factor in her analysis of potential adverse interests. Justice 
Field took the position that an investigative proceeding before an 
administrative agency did not provide for contestation of the kind that 
would support a federal judicial role in the issuance of subpoenas;100 on this 
view, one might limit federal courts to the issuance of subpoenas only in 
support of their own contested proceedings rather than as an adjunct to 
proceedings elsewhere. Woolhandler does not say whether Justice Field 
was right to dismiss such potential adverseness on the basis that it would 
unfold outside the Article III judiciary. Nor does she take a position as to 
whether the adverse proceedings of foreign courts might provide an 
adverse-interest basis for an original petition to a federal court for the 
96 Id. at 1119–20. 
97 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1462–63 (noting that “unlike the targets of other warrant 
proceedings, most FISA targets will never learn that the surveillance has been carried out” because the 
surveillance is carried out covertly and the warrant proceedings are classified). 
98 Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1046. 
99 Id. at 1039–40. 
100 See In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 257–59, 257 n.1 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887); see also Pfander 
& Birk, supra note 2, at 1379–80 (discussing Justice Field’s opinion). 
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issuance of letters rogatory (essentially subpoenas to collect evidence in the 
United States for use before foreign tribunals). 
In essence, then, Professor Woolhandler presents a more elegant 
version of the work we criticized in our earlier piece.101 Many scholars have 
considered only a piece of the available evidence, criticizing the exercise of 
non-contentious jurisdiction as a violation of Article III and treating 
counterexamples as anomalies. That was the approach taken by Ralph 
Avery, for example, in highlighting certain uncontested features of 
bankruptcy administration.102 Woolhandler, like us, embraces bankruptcy 
administration and equity receiverships as appropriate exercises of judicial 
power even in the absence of contestation, and would apparently reject 
Avery’s view of Article III limits.103 But like other scholars,104 she 
continues to dismiss naturalization (and other examples we adduce) as 
anomalous because her theory cannot account for or explain it.105 
In contrast, we attempted to construct a framework for the exercise of 
non-contentious jurisdiction that could apply to a range of situations.106 So 
long as Congress acts pursuant to its enumerated powers in creating a right 
and assigns the federal courts final authority over applications by parties to 
claim such a right, we think federal courts can entertain uncontested 
applications to register claims to the right in question.107 Procedural due 
process will ensure notice to interested parties and will invalidate any 
scheme (such as feigned or collusive litigation) that threatens to injure the 
rights of nonparties.108 By assigning the question to Congress to resolve as a 
matter of policy, we would rationalize the cases in terms of congressional, 
rather than judicial, power. To be sure, we would support efforts to limit 
the non-contentious role of the federal courts, especially when federal 
agencies can readily perform the work.109 And we would encourage the 
courts to refrain from making far-reaching legal pronouncements in the 
context of uncontested adjudication.110 As these suggested prudential 
101 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1391–402. 
102 See Avery, supra note 16, at 418 n.137. 
103 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1033–35.  
104 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 85–86 (7th ed. 2015); Morley, supra note 18, at 668–70. 
105 Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1065. 
106 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1440–55 (describing framework); id. at 1455–71 (applying 
framework to applications for certificates of appealability by habeas corpus petitioners, the “probate 
exception” to federal court jurisdiction, extradition proceedings, FISA courts, and more). 
107 Id. at 1440–45. 
108 See id. at 1450. 
109 See id. at 1443. 
110 See id. at 1453–55. 
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limitations illustrate, we seek not to encourage Congress to make wide-
ranging use of non-contentious jurisdiction, but instead to make sense of 
Article III. 
B. The Need for a Textual Account
Professor Woolhandler similarly fails to come to grips with the text of 
Article III either to defend her adverse-interests account or to refute our 
suggested distinction between contentious and non-contentious jurisdiction. 
We showed that the early interpretation of the word “Case” in Article III, 
as a claim of right in the forms prescribed by law, was capacious enough to 
authorize both forms of adjudication.111 By contrast, the word 
“Controversy” connotes a dispute between party opponents identified in 
Article III and seems to rule out non-contentious jurisdiction.112 We 
coupled this textual claim with evidence from practice: federal courts 
consistently took up non-contentious chores in federal question “cases,” 
and refused to do such work in connection with state law “controversies.”113 
Indeed, we cited evidence that the probate exception derived from the 
requirements of contestation embedded in the term “Controversies.”114 We 
also showed that the conflation of the terms cases and controversies first 
occurred in the late nineteenth century, in an apparent effort to impose a 
new requirement of contestation in federal question cases.115 
Professor Woolhandler does not dispute any of this head on and thus 
fails to address the possibility that Article III requires contestation only as 
to controversies and not as to cases. She does observe that scholars have 
proposed alternative distinctions, including the suggestion (which one of us 
endorses) that the term “Controversies” includes only matters of a civil 
nature and thus differs from the more inclusive reference to “Cases” of 
both a criminal and civil nature.116 But one can accept that suggested 
distinction without rejecting our claim that the judicial power in cases, but 
not in controversies, extends to both contested and uncontested 
proceedings. Both distinctions may well be true. In any case, the work by 
earlier scholars on the case–controversy distinction was published long 
before our non-contentious account appeared in print. We think it misses 
111 Id. at 1417–21. 
112 Id. at 1423–24. 
113 Pfander & Damrau, supra note 92, at 119; Pfander & Downey, supra note 91, at 1556–57. 
114 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1457–58. 
115 Id. at 1421–22. 
116 Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1028 n.9 (listing John Harrison and Daniel Meltzer as scholars 
who endorse this view). See generally James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original 
Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 604–12 (1994) (distinguishing cases from 
controversies). 
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the point to treat earlier scholarship (which failed to anticipate and evaluate 
our non-contentious account of Article III), as having rejected a theory that 
was unavailable at the time the scholars in question did their work.117 
We find an intriguing echo of our proposed distinction between cases 
and controversies in the suggestive work of Dean Christopher Columbus 
Langdell. In contrasting the practice in courts of common law with that in 
courts of equity, Langdell recognized the existence of non-contentious 
jurisdiction. He thus explained that the “jurisdiction of a court of [common] 
law is contentious only, that is, it is strictly limited to deciding 
controversies.”118 By contrast, Langdell explained, the power of the 
chancellor in a court of equity is not “limited to deciding controversies.”119 
To illustrate non-contentious jurisdiction in equity, Langdell invoked the 
power of the trustee to apply to the chancellor for instructions. Such bills 
did not, in Langdell’s telling, seek to resolve a contest over the trustee’s 
“misconduct” but instead sought to clarify the nature of the trustee’s duty 
and to secure “the assistance and protection of the court.”120 In confirming 
the viability of non-contentious jurisdiction, Langdell did not point to any 
hypothetical adverse interests as the key to the trustee’s ability to invoke 
equity’s power, but instead viewed the chancellor’s power as a reflection of 
equity’s role in administering the law of trusts. 
By failing to attend to the distinction between cases and controversies, 
and between contentious and non-contentious jurisdiction, Professor 
Woolhandler focuses in the main on matters that began—and thus came to 
the Supreme Court—as contested disputes.121 These matters might arrive 
either as federal question cases or as diverse-party controversies, but they 
both represent exercises of contentious jurisdiction. Needless to say, in 
considering such forms of litigation, the Court’s statements will tend to 
emphasize the need for contestation and to question its absence. Some of 
what the Court has said about feigned and collusive suits, for example, can 
be understood as seeking to maintain the forms of contestation for 
117 Of course, some scholars did anticipate our conclusions in suggesting that cases and 
controversies meant different things in Article III. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 
450 (1994). 
118 C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING 34 (2d ed. 1883). 
119 Id. at 40. 
120 Id. 
121 Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1039 n.58 (citing McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 
259 (1870), a contested forfeiture action, but acknowledging that a court order was needed even where 
no contestants appeared); id. at 1115–16 nn.59–63 (detailing more contested cases). 
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contentious jurisdiction.122 To understand non-contentious jurisdiction 
(particularly in its original form), one must attend to what the Court has 
said and done with uncontested applications to the lower federal courts, 
where such matters originate. We showed that, in a variety of different 
settings, the Court has upheld the exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction 
by lower federal courts.123 The fact that the Court had no occasion to 
confirm the validity of naturalization as consistent with Gilded-Age 
pronouncements about Article III until its 1926 decision in Tutun, after 
Congress had switched to a somewhat more adversarial model, offers no 
proof against the probative value of the prior experience of the lower 
courts, which the Court took pains to reaffirm.124 
C. The Lessons of History
Our theory of non-contentious jurisdiction is explicitly grounded in a 
widely-known feature of court practice and legal treatises in the eighteenth 
century. Professor Woolhandler, by contrast, does not explicitly ground her 
construct in historical sources, preferring instead to offer her adverse-
interest theory as a way to bring some anomalous federal court proceedings 
into alignment with contemporary conceptions of the judicial power.125 
Woolhandler does not, however, point to any historical sources supporting 
the creation of an “adverse interest” subspecies. Even if both conventional 
federal controversies and certain of the ex parte cases on which she focuses 
could be reconceptualized as involving adverse interests, there is no 
indication that observers from the eighteenth century considered the 
existence of adverse interests as central to the judicial cognizability of 
those cases. We have seen no source from the eighteenth or early 
nineteenth century that seeks to defend naturalization or other early forms 
as proper instances of adverse-interest contestation. 
122 See, e.g., Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892) (rejecting 
“friendly” challenges to legislation absent an “honest and actual antagonistic” relationship between the 
parties). See generally Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1433−38 (discussing and providing examples). 
123 See, e.g., Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1393–401 (citing Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 
568 (1926)); id. at 1380 & n.149 (citing Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 489 
(1894)); id. at 1381 (citing Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 434 (1956)); id. at 1382–84 (citing 
Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998)); id. at 1386 & n.181 (citing In re Metro. Ry. Receivership, 
208 U.S. 90, 107 (1908)); id. at 1387 & n.184 (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 
(1928)); cf. id. at 1367 & n.78 (citing Justice Story’s circuit court decision in The Margaretta, 16 F. 
Cas. 719, 721 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9,027), which treated petitions for remission or mitigation as 
within the judicial power). 
124 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1397–99; Tutun, 270 U.S. at 576. 
125 See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1036–40 (conceptualizing prize cases as default 
judgments in an in rem suit as consistent with procedural due process requirements of the time). 
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To the contrary, the historical evidence we collected suggests that 
many of the practices Professor Woolhandler now defines as supported by 
adverse interests were explained in the eighteenth century as instances of 
non-contentious jurisdiction. For example, even though potential 
adversaries presumably lurk in the background of any uncontested 
application for probate of a will, Blackstone’s Commentaries recognizes 
the category of non-contentious jurisdiction in a brief discussion of probate 
practice.126 Discussing the matter of non-contentious jurisdiction at 
somewhat greater length, Thomas Wood’s eighteenth-century treatise 
described consent as the key to distinguishing contentious and non-
contentious jurisdiction.127 Wood treats emancipation, manumission, and 
adoption as instances of non-contentious jurisdiction and then refers to 
“several other legal Acts granted by the Judge upon request, and by consent 
of all Parties.”128 Woolhandler regards these matters of consensual 
adjustment as reflecting the resolution of a conflict between parties holding 
adverse interests. But that’s not the way eighteenth-century thinkers 
explained the judicial role in overseeing consensual adjustment. It seems to 
us far more likely that the Framers shared the eighteenth-century 
understanding rather than the revisionist understanding put forth one or two 
centuries later. 
D. Normative and Methodological Considerations
Professor Woolhandler does not advance any explicit normative 
arguments in the course of defending her suggested adverse-interest 
requirement. Nor does she explain the methodological basis on which she 
would regard such a requirement as constitutionally compelled by Article 
III. Indeed, the absence of normative or policy-based justifications for such
a requirement, or for its selective relaxation in particular cases involving
relatively remote adverse interests, suggests that Woolhandler writes with a
view toward defending a particular conception of Article III adjudication.
We welcome such terms of engagement, having attempted ourselves to
offer a more satisfying account of certain non-contentious features of
judicial practice. As we explained, we do not mean to advance a normative
case for the proposition that federal courts should devote more time to their
non-contentious activities. To the contrary, we urged congressional
restraint in making non-contentious assignments.129
126 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *98. 
127 See THOMAS WOOD, A NEW INSTITUTE OF THE IMPERIAL OR CIVIL LAW 293 (4th ed. 1730). 
128 See id.; Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1406. 
129 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1449−50, 1473. 
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We nonetheless appear to have touched a nerve. On our view of the 
Article III case, parties do not need an injury in fact to pursue a claim in 
federal court.130 Rather, as Chief Justice Marshall explained, they need only 
assert their rights “in the form prescribed by law.”131 That could mean that 
Congress has the power to assign a broader array of both contentious and 
non-contentious matters to the federal courts. Or, if the Supreme Court 
were inclined to maintain its standing rules, a thoroughgoing acceptance of 
non-contentious jurisdiction might require the Court to provide 
justifications for its doctrine apart from its familiar claim that the history of 
legal practice at the time of the framing inflexibly called for the assertion of 
claims by plaintiffs who were seeking redress for injuries inflicted by 
defendants.132 Redress of injuries was certainly one form of adjudication 
known to the Framers, but it did not exhaust the category. 
Professor Woolhandler previously defended the Court’s standing 
jurisprudence on historical grounds. As in her response to our work on non-
contentious jurisdiction, Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson offered a qualified 
defense of standing law against challenges based on evidence that historical 
practice was inconsistent with the notion that Article III adjudication has 
always been limited to those making claims for redress of injuries in fact.133 
As with her response to our work, the earlier paper accorded a good deal of 
weight to evolving judicial practice in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and sought to distinguish counterexamples as 
uncommon or anomalous even as it sought to restate the conventional 
wisdom in more readily defensible terms.134 Perhaps we can understand the 
130 Id. at 1452 (“In deploying non-contentious jurisdiction, Congress can create individual rights 
and enable individuals to bring an ex parte action in federal court to secure formal recognition of the 
right in question. Such individuals have not suffered an ‘injury-in-fact’; rather, they seek to establish a 
legal interest through the assertion of their claim.”); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and 
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 485–90 (1996) (refuting 
the claim that standing requires an injury in fact). 
131 Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1453 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
738, 819 (1824)). 
132 Thus, some eighty years ago, Justice Felix Frankfurter explained that the federal “[j]udicial 
power could come into play only in matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at 
Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted ‘Cases’ or 
‘Controversies.’” Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
133 See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 61. But cf. Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public 
Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969) (showing that the personal 
interest requirement of modern standing doctrine lacks historical support in both early English and 
American legal tradition); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1406–09 (1988) (arguing that standing law’s injury-in-fact 
requirement was at odds with the early willingness of federal courts to hear suits brought by informers 
who sought bounties rather than redress of injuries personal to themselves). 
134 See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 61. 
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current paper as a reflection of Woolhandler’s continuing commitment to 
the view that history does not defeat modern standing doctrine. After all, 
one of the implications we drew from our invocation of non-contentious 
jurisdiction was that the “injury” requirement central to modern standing 
doctrine does not accurately describe the non-contentious cases common in 
early federal, state, and European courts.135 
But such an approach to scholarship on the meaning of Article III 
leaves us uncertain about the normative justification and workability of the 
regime the author seeks to defend. Consider, for example, the problem of 
deciding when the interest of a potential adversary achieves the degree of 
concreteness needed to satisfy the demands of Article III. As we have seen, 
many authors have invoked the construct of the potential adversary as a 
way to square seemingly anomalous practices with the presumed 
applicability of an adverse-party requirement.136 But these authors, like 
Professor Woolhandler, rarely explain how concrete or specific a possible 
adverse interest must be to satisfy the supposed Article III standard. Does 
litigation yielding a consent decree qualify? How about a settlement class 
action? Must the holder of an adversarial interest be notified of the 
proceeding and invited to participate? Or do more remote prospects of 
adversarial participation suffice? 
One might begin to answer such questions with a normative account 
of the purposes served by an adverse-interest or adverse-party requirement. 
But Professor Woolhandler does not offer such an account. We thus lack 
any set of tools with which to draw a line between the sufficiently and 
insufficiently adverse interest. Should we align ourselves with Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s Windsor opinion in viewing the adverse-party 
requirement as one the Court might dispense with on the basis of prudential 
considerations, or should we follow Justice Scalia’s lead in viewing the 
requirement as a crucial element of Article III?137 Neither the practices that 
Woolhandler catalogs nor the reasons they arose help to resolve that 
puzzle. 
Nor does Professor Woolhandler evaluate the application of her 
construct of adverse interests to other matters within Article III such as the 
provision for jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different 
states. Our paper takes up controversies, arguing that they require a dispute 
between opponents and differ from cases on this score. Extending that idea 
135 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 2, at 1451−54. 
136 Id. at 1393−96. 
137 Compare United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685−88 (2013) (Kennedy, J.) (describing 
adverse-party requirement as prudential), with id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (portraying adverse-
party requirement as an element of Article III). 
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in related work, one of us has argued that the distinction between “Cases” 
and “Controversies” may help to explain such venerable Article III puzzles 
as the inability of the federal courts to entertain matters falling within the 
so-called probate and domestic relations exceptions.138 Because state law 
typically provides the rule of decision for such matters, they come to 
federal diversity dockets as “Controversies” between citizens of different 
states.139 But some of the state court proceedings within the categories in 
question, such as common-form probate proceedings and certain domestic 
relations matters (for example, marriage; adoption; custody and 
guardianship appointments) proceed on the basis of non-contentious 
jurisdiction.140 Either no contest has emerged (as in common-form probate 
proceedings) or the parties come to court to register an agreed-upon change 
in legal status, as with adoption proceedings. The absence of any 
“Controversy” between disputing parties helps to explain, we argued, why 
these non-contentious matters do not qualify for adjudication under Article 
III (at least so long as they remain governed by state law). We also 
observed that if Congress were to federalize the substantive law, then such 
matters could be brought to federal courts as “Cases.”141 
Adverse interests, however, doubtless lurk beneath the surface of 
these nominally uncontested matters of probate and family law. Sometimes, 
a dispute breaks into the open, necessitating the transformation of a 
common-form probate proceeding into a formal will contest.142 But often 
the adverse interests (between the birth mother, say, and the adoptive 
parents or between the administrator of the estate who institutes probate in 
the common form and some of the estate’s potential beneficiaries) are 
submerged or compromised. We believe that the absence of an open 
controversy would foreclose the exercise of party-based jurisdiction, thus 
helping to explain why these matters fall outside Article III. How would 
Professor Woolhandler treat the potential presence of adverse interests in 
evaluating party-based jurisdiction? If the possibility of contestation creates 
138 See Pfander & Damrau, supra note 92, at 118–19 (contending that uncontested domestic 
relations matters governed by state law are outside the Article III power, while such matters governed 
by federal law could be heard as “cases”); Pfander & Downey, supra note 91, at 1556–59 
(distinguishing contested proceedings from ex parte “common form” probate applications that elude 
federal judicial power over controversies). 
139 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (conferring diversity jurisdiction); id. § 1652 (prescribing state 
law as the rule of decision, except where otherwise provided). 
140 Pfander & Damrau, supra note 92, at 151, 154; Pfander & Downey, supra note 91, at 1558. 
141 Pfander & Damrau, supra note 92, at 149; Pfander & Downey, supra note 91, at 1577. 
142 See Pfander & Downey, supra note 91, at 1553. 
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adverse interests sufficient to meet the Article III requirement,143 then 
perhaps the Constitution would allow federal courts to exercise diversity 
jurisdiction over uncontested matters of state law on the theory that the 
potential for adversary litigation creates the sort of “controversy” necessary 
to satisfy the party-based heads of Article III jurisdiction. On that view, 
Congress could assign common-form probate matters or other uncontested 
matters of state law to the federal diversity docket, assuming the potential 
contestants were citizens of different states. Such a “case-or-controversy” 
requirement would apply the same adverse-interest construct across the 
Article III menu, but would produce unusual results. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, we take heart that so accomplished a scholar as Ann 
Woolhandler has judged our work worthy of extended comment. We 
attempt to repay the compliment here, probing her ideas and defending our 
account of the exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction. Woolhandler has 
helped us to see the doctrine more clearly, but we at least remain persuaded 
that cases and controversies differ from one another. Cases, unlike 
controversies, encompass the exercise of jurisdiction over uncontested 
assertions of a claim of right. Uncontested proceedings—naturalization 
petitions, warrant applications, prize claims, and many others—peppered 
the dockets of the federal courts in the early Republic. Their appearance 
can best be explained as an outgrowth of the non-contentious jurisdiction 
that we Americans inherited from the English civilians. Reclaiming that 
civil law inheritance may unsettle the originalist case for standing and 
adverse-party doctrine, but we hope it will also improve our understanding 
of the old world the Framers inherited and the new world that they made. 
143 See Woolhandler, supra note 3, at 1036–46 (describing the potential for adverse argument in 
prize, remission, and warrant cases to provide the necessary adverseness to satisfy Article III). 
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